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The fact that older women are less likely to have health insurance 
coverage than they were a decade ago is not surprising, but the fact that 
they are about half as likely to have individual coverage than a decade 
ago is surprising. That they are about half as likely as younger women 
to have health insurance coverage as a dependent is sobering, as is the 
fact that nearly a quarter of older working women with health problems 
have no health insurance at all.
From the CPS, we have evidence that small firms are more likely 
than large firms to employ low-wage workers. We also see persistently 
lower wage levels among women, and especially among older women. 
It shouldn't altogether surprise us that these paths converge in a way 
that disadvantages older women in the workforce.
So there are a couple of problems to be solved. Len was charged 
with solving those problems—and did indeed think outside the box— 
and he certainly is a good seller of his perspective. But his discussion 
raised at least two questions in my mind: what would be the source of 
coverage for this population and what would be the source of subsi 
dies? These are low-wage individuals and low-wage families; as was 
mentioned in the last session, we know that these families require sub 
sidies to buy insurance. While I wouldn't expect to dictate what an 
individual should pay for health insurance, I would guess it would be 
something less than a tithe, less than 10 percent of family income. 
Therefore, I would guess that virtually all families below 200 percent 
of poverty, and perhaps higher, would need a significant subsidy to buy 
health insurance.
Len raises several possibilities for pooling risk, including FEHBP 
and state employee plans. We have been the route of mandated 
employer coverage in the private sector, and we abandoned it for a cou 
ple of reasons. Groups of any size don't like to accept individuals. 
From an underwriting perspective, individuals are a very different cast 
of characters. Employee plans are groups that form not for the purpose 
of insurance, individuals arrive explicitly for coverage, raising signifi-
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cantly the potential for adverse selection. People who seek coverage 
when they are sick are more expensive than the population average and 
more expensive than a group community rate. The only question is 
how much more expensive will these people be? It is not a question of 
whether individuals would like to be pooled with employee groups, 
but, from an insurance perspective and from an underwriting perspec 
tive, the two are very different. We have to worry also about people 
dropping away and destabilizing the group when they believe that they 
no longer need health insurance. Pools of employees don't pose that 
problem to the extent that pools of individuals do in a voluntary sys 
tem.
The program that Len envisions is appealing in some dimensions, 
but I would argue it is very unappealing in others, such as equity. Why 
would we want to construct yet another narrow program for a narrow 
subset of the deserving whomever? Why does an older woman who is 
sick and of low income deserve coverage more than a younger woman 
who is sick and of low income, or an older man who is sick and of low 
income? I don't understand why we would discriminate across a popu 
lation on the basis of age and gender, when in fact we don't allow that 
discrimination in any other aspect of our civic life.
We already have some programs expressly for people who are low 
income and people who are sick: Medicaid and Medicare. We have 
additional, usually very small programs in many states. In 28 states, 
there are more or less well-functioning high-risk pools. I would like to 
spend a few minutes talking about what those high-risk pools are and 
why HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
that Karen Pollitz talked to you about yesterday, might be a model for 
helping them to work better.
As I mentioned, 28 states have high-risk pools, although in five big 
states—California, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, and Utah—they are 
closed to new enrollment. Despite the fact that high-risk pools are 
struggling in these and many other states, there are only seven states in 
this country that have no provision at all for high-risk individuals. 
Among the states that provide for high-risk individuals, one requires 
guaranteed issue and risk adjustments. Another caps the proportion of 
high risk that any one insurer must accept relative to its total business. 
TennCare blends Tennessee's high-risk pool with its Medicaid and 
CHIP programs. But the most common model is a separate high-risk
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pool, and the most common source of funding for these high-risk pools 
is an assessment on commercial insurers and Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans.
Well, you see the problem. States that fund a high-risk pool with a 
tax on insurers in effect reward employers who are self-insured. In 
turn, the tax base to support high risk becomes smaller as employers 
remove themselves from it. Hence, without federal action helping 
high-risk pools, they may be a lost cause; but with federal action on the 
model of HIPAA, they might work quite well by reaching across group 
plans, individual plans, insured plans, and self-insured plans, treating 
them as an insurance system that would support high-risk individuals 
without access to group coverage.
There are other aspects of high risk that might be fixed with 
HIPAA-type federal legislation. Many states have narrowed insurers' 
rating practices, especially in the small-group market but also in the 
individual market. At present, six states limit rate variation for health 
to less than two to one in the individual market, and eight states pro 
hibit health rating altogether in this market. The latter is the commu 
nity rate that Len talked about; there are indeed problems with low-risk 
people dropping coverage. But if there were a high-risk pool that 
would readily accept and fully subsidize excess risk, the community 
rate could be much lower in the general market.
In fact, the literature on the effect of a community rate on coverage 
in the individual market is extremely meager. I have not yet seen a 
study only of the individual market that evaluates the impact of regula 
tion. Nevertheless, Len's comment that some kinds of regulation 
depress coverage in the small-group market seems true from what we 
know thus far, and it is probably also the case in the individual market. 
Yet, if a high-risk pool accepted all extreme risks, then one would 
expect the standard rate in the conventional market could be signifi 
cantly lower and prohibition of health rating would not depress cover 
age. For example, Minnesota has the largest high-risk pool in the 
country, with over 25,000 people participating. Minnesota is a market 
in which insurers underwrite aggressively, and the high-risk pool actu 
ally has a distribution of risk. Its rates are affordable because of the 
distribution of risk in the pool as well as the usual subsidy to the pool.
At present, 11 states limit age rating in the individual market sig 
nificantly, and 3 states prohibit rating on age altogether in the individ-
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ual market. Eleven states also limit composite rating: that is, all rate 
factors taken together cannot produce greater variation in rates than the 
statutory limit. Those markets have not fallen apart, and they deserve 
closer investigation as potential models for new federal law constrain 
ing insurer rates, especially in the presence of a state program to absorb 
high risk.
In closing, I would argue that a principal danger is to try to fix too 
much. That is especially a danger when looking at private/public com 
binations that rely heavily on private markets to resolve problems of 
noncoverage. One example of attempting to fix too much may be 
states' efforts to reduce the waiting period for coverage of preexisting 
conditions, eliminating it or making it very brief. There I would argue 
that HIPAA offers a reasonable model. HIPAA provides that, if you do 
not come from an insurance plan, you have a waiting period on preex 
isting conditions up to 12 months, with a 6-month look-back. It is not 
perfect, but it recognizes the frailties of a voluntary system. If we are 
not going to require coverage, either of individuals or employers, then 
we must deal in reasonable improvements, knowing that they assure 
neither seamless protection nor universal coverage, especially for peo 
ple with health problems.
